Notes on Caseworker Discretion

A short review of research related to caseworker discretion in program assignment

Bolhaar, Ketel, and van der Klaauw (2018)

• direct matching to vacancies improves exit
• program participation leads to worse outcomes including compared to offering no guidance
• caseworkers, even with information on effectiveness make non-optimal assignments, reducing discretion makes sense

Huber, Lechner, and Mellace (2016)

• research indicates less accommodating caseworkers are more successful in placing people in employment
• the results are due less to effective program mix of interventions are more to threat of sanctions

Lechner and Smith (2007)

• caseworker do not efficiently assign clients to interventions based on effectiveness
• distortions in the decision-process could have a number of reasons;
  • lack appropriate knowledge
  • goals other than efficiency
  • interference from other regulations

Bolhaar, Jonneke, Nadine Ketel, and Bas van der Klaauw. 2018. “Caseworker’s Discretion and the Effectiveness of Welfare-to-Work Programs.” Working Paper 11666. IZA Discussion Papers. https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/185126.

Huber, Martin, Michael Lechner, and Giovanni Mellace. 2016. “Why Do Tougher Caseworkers Increase Employment? The Role of Program Assignment as a Causal Mechanism.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 99 (1): 180–83. https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00632.

Lechner, Michael, and Jeffrey Smith. 2007. “What Is the Value Added by Caseworkers?” Labour Economics 14 (2): 135–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2004.12.002.